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Abstract—Recent studies identify that Deep learning Neural
Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to subtle perturbations, which
are not perceptible to human visual system but can fool the DNN
models and lead to wrong outputs. A class of adversarial attack
network algorithms has been proposed to generate robust physi-
cal perturbations under different circumstance. These algorithms
are the first efforts to move forward secure deep learning by
providing an avenue to train future defense networks, however,
the intrinsic complexity of them prevents their broader usage.
In this paper, we propose the first hardware accelerator for
adversarial attacks based on memristor crossbar arrays. Our de-
sign significantly improves the throughput of a visual adversarial
perturbation system, which can further improve the robustness
and security of future deep learning systems. Based on the
algorithm uniqueness, we propose four implementations for the
adversarial attack accelerator (A3) to improve the throughput,
energy efficiency, and computational efficiency.
Index Terms—Deep Learning Visual Classification, Hardware
Accelerator, Adversarial Attacks, Memristor Crossbar
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent breakthroughs in Artificial intelligence (AI) espe-
cially Deep Learning [1] have made great advances in many
application fields including Autonomous Driving, Go game,
and High-frequent trading in security markets, etc. However,
recent studies in the computer vision area identify that Deep-
learning Neural Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to subtle
perturbations to inputs which are not perceptible to human
beings but can fool the DNN models and lead to wrong
outputs [2]. Many algorithms were proposed to generate
robust visual adversarial perturbations under different physical
circumstances [3] [4] [5] [6]. These algorithms basically
include a forward-propagation process and a error-propagation
process. The former is similar to an inference procedure in
regular Convolution Neural Networks (CNNs), while the latter
is different from conventional CNN training process in that
the inputs rather than the synaptic weights are changed in the
back-propagation process.
The RP2 algorithm [3] and other adversarial attack networks
(AttackNet) [4] [5] [6] are the first efforts to move toward
secure deep learning by providing an avenue to train future
defense networks [7] [8] [9] [10]. However, the intrinsic com-
plexity of these algorithms prevents broader usage of them.
Although recent proposals for CNN training architectures may
apply to AttackNet, they were not specifically designed for the
unique needs of the algorithm, resulting in low efficiency. The
CNN training process consists of a Forward Propagation (FP)
and a Backward Propagation (BP) for both errors and weights,
while AttackNet includes the FP but a different BP for errors
only. For a network with depth L, the duration of the neurons
of layer l in the buffer is 2(L−l)+1 in CNN training process,
which indicates that a large buffer is needed to minimize
the gap between memory and the processor. Meanwhile, for
the RP2 algorithm, the duration of neurons of any layer in
the buffer is only 1. We quantitatively analyzed the neuron
storage requirements of benchmarks used in this work in Fig.1.
The experiment results have been normalized to that of RP2
training. We can see that the overall storage requirement of the
RP2 training is less than 1/10 of the CNN training. Although
we take RP2 as a specific example to demonstrate our designs
in this work, the optimization techniques we introduced can
also be applied to other adversarial attack networks.
Analog in-situ memristor crossbar arrays have been widely
used as a potential neural network accelerator because it
largely reduces the energy cost of data movement. Prior
research [11] [12] [13] [14] demonstrated that memristor
designs outperform GPU and ASIC designs [15] [16] in
both throughput and energy saving. Although Pipelayer [14]
has developed a CNN training platform based on memristor
crossbar arrays, directly deploying AttackNet to Pipelayer is
highly inefficient [17]. First, AttackNet does not require the
same amount of on-chip buffers as what CNN training does.
The back propagation process of AttackNet only involves
error propagation without updating weights, which can relieve
the neuron storage requirement. Unnecessary on-chip buffers
consume too much energy and area. Second, the utilization
of memristor crossbar arrays is low. Pipelayer utilizes dual-
crossbar to store weight values, which are calculated by
collecting the difference between a positive crossbar subarray
and a negative crossbar subarray. In this way, the on-chip
crossbar utilization has been reduced by half.
In this paper, we first identify the uniqueness of the typi-
cal visual adversarial perturbation algorithm. We analyze its
dataflow and data dependence. To our knowledge, we propose
the first hardware accelerator for adversarial attacks (A3)
using memristor crossbar arrays to significantly improve the
throughput of the visual adversarial perturbation system. As
a result, the robustness and security of future deep learning
systems can also be improved. The main contributions of this
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Fig. 1: Neuron storage analysis
paper can be summarized as follows.
• We quantitatively demonstrate that directly deploying
AttackNets training on existing CNN training platforms
is inefficient in both performance and energy.
• We explore methods of buffer reduction to increase
compute engines and therefore improve the performance.
• We incorporate single crossbar storage into the training
process to improve the crossbar utilization and to further
boost the performance.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The training process of CNN and AttackNet Algorithms
The network architecture of both applications is cascaded,
layer by layer. As shown in Fig.2, the training process of
CNN can be divided into two stages, forward propagation
(FP) and back propagation (BP). We denote the output of
the neurons at layer l − 1 as dl−1. During FP, The output
of the neurons at the next layer (layer l) can be computed by
first convolving dl−1 with the weight matrix W l, then going
through an activation function f . There are two steps in the
BP of CNN. The first step is to compute errors (also called
sensitivity in some literature) and propagate them backwards
layer by layer. Such process is denoted as EP in this work. In
the second step, the gradients of the weights at each layer l,
∆W l, are computed based on the error δl and the output dl−1.
Once all the gradients are available, the weight matrices for
all layers can be updated in parallel using gradient descent.
We refer this weight-related process as WP.
For AttackNet, its FP is roughly the same as that of the
CNN. However, in contrast to CNN, whose BP includes both
the EP and the WP processes, AttackNet’s BP stage involves
only EP, with the addition that it also computes the partial
derivative of the loss function with respect to the perturbation
input, in order to update the input. (The weights of the
AttackNet are not updated and thus there is no need to compute
∆W l neither.)
B. AttackNet Applications
At a high level, AttackNet takes in an adversarial image,
which is a combination of the original/clean image and a
perturbation image (called “mask” in some literatures), to
proceed the FP process. While the loss function of a regular
Fig. 2: CNN training algorithm V.S. AttackNet training al-
gorithm. ∗ and ◦ denote the convolution operation and the
element-wise production respectively.
Fig. 3: AttackNet training scheme at a high level.
CNN is often based on the outputs of the FP and the target
labels, the loss of an AttackNet additionally incorporates the
norm of the perturbation image. In BP, different from CNN
training, AttackNet only executes the EP process. At the end of
BP, it computes the error/derivative of the perturbation image
and uses the derivative to update the perturbation (mask). This
completes one training iteration. Multiple iterations are taken
to train an optimal attack perturbation.
C. Neural Network Acceleration in Crossbar
There are a lot of work about neural network processing
in memory. A neural network is composed of convolutional
layers, pooling layers and full connected layers. All of above
layers’ computation can be transformed into a Matrix-Vector
multiplication. For a convolutional layer or a full connected
layer, the weights of it are programmed in crossbar in a matrix
which is called weight matrix. For max pooling layer, a matrix
of 4 × 6 (which is composed of 0,1,-1) is programmed in
crossbar [12]. For average pooling layer, a matrix of 4 × 6
(which is composed of 1) is programmed in crossbar.
2
Fig. 4: A3 architecture. Black circle a©, b© and c© refer to
crossbar, Shift&Add unit and Max pooling unit, respectively.
Red number circles refer to data flow.
Generally, the resistance 1/gij (the crossing point at the ith
row and the jth column) can only be positive value, while the
weight value may be negative, so a ‘positive’ crossbar and
a ‘negative’ crossbar are utilized to store a matrix of rational
values in dual-crossbar storage situation. If a weight value wij
is negative, gij− is larger than gij+ so that gij+−gij− = wij .
If a weight value wij is positive, gij+ is larger than gij− so
that gij+ − gij− = wij . Considering the limited resistance
of crossbar cells, bit slicing was used to store a single weight
value, which means multi-cells in the same word line are used
to store a value.
The crossbar performs a matrix-vector multiplication by
imposing different voltages, which equal the components of
the vector, to different word lines. The current flows along
the bit line can be seen as the dot product of two vectors. The
above process being performed in many bit lines can represent
a matrix-vector multiplication.
III. A3 ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we first introduce the adversarial attack
accelerator (A3) architecture, followed by the first optimization
with trading off buffer storage with compute engines and the
second optimization about improving the crossbar utilization.
Finally, we present other associated unit designs.
At a high level, A3 is mainly composed of storage units
and functional units. The functional units are composed of
crossbars, DACs, ADCs, Shift&Add units, activation func-
tional units, and max-pooling units. The storage units consist
of eDRAM and input/output registers. We additionally deploy
a peripheral circuit unit, in which the most important compo-
nent is a finite state machine to control instruction flow. To
support the training process, the peripheral circuit also covers
a subtractor and a multiplier to calculate the errors at the end
of FP. The overall architecture is shown in Fig.4.
The data flow of A3 is shown in red number circles in Fig.4.
During FP, inputs are loaded from eDRAM to input registers
Fig. 5: Weight mapping to crossbars. Two cell in the same row
to store a weight value, and each cell is 4-bit. The technique
is called bit slicing.
(step 1©), then fed to crossbars after going through a digital-
to-analog converter (DAC) (step 2©). The crossbars perform
the matrix-vector multiplication. The results of dot-product
operations flow through an analog-to-digital converter (step
3©), shift and accumulate the adjacent bit line in Shift&Add
units (step 4©). Next, the dot-product results are forwarded
to activation units. All the above operations are performed in
a logical cycle. After the activation, there are two paths. If
the layer is followed by a pooling layer, the data flows into
another cycle to perform the pooling operation. At the end of
this cycle, the results are stored to output registers. Otherwise,
the results bypass the pooling unit and are stored to output
register directly (step 5©).
The weights of a network layer are programmed into
crossbars in the form of a matrix. The method to transform the
computations of a convolutional layer can be found in cuDNN
documents [18]. The strategy of mapping weights to crossbars
is similar to [11], as shown in Fig.5. The weight matrices
corresponding to the connections of the same channel (red)
of the next layer are mapped to a logical bit line, followed
by matrices of other channels (yellow, green) of the same
layer. All the logical bit lines of the same layer make up of a
logical mapping matrix. To maximize the usage of overlapping
neurons of adjacent convolution operations, multiple copies
of the logical mapping matrix are put after each other when
programming the weight matrix to the crossbar. In A3, we
use two physical bit lines to represent a logical line. Different
3
Fig. 6: Weight storage using single crossbar
from traditional PIM platforms such as Pipelayer, A3 exploits
memory (eDRAM, input/output registers) optimization with
the same power budget and the same area. It is unnecessary
to allocate as large a buffer space as Pipelayer because A3
only performs the error propagation (EP) process. Reducing
memory brings power and area reduction at the same time. The
power reduction or area reduction makes room for crossbars.
To further increase the throughput, A3 uses a single crossbar
to store weight values, nearly doubling the utilization of
crossbars. Furthermore, we redesign the Shift&Add units and
Max pooling units to support the modification. More details
will be shown in the following sections.
A. Trading off storage with compute engines: A3p and A3r
As illustrated in Fig.2, CNN needs to compute the gradient
of weights before updating the corresponding weight matrix.
The neurons of feature maps on layer l − 1 are involved
when the system computes the gradient of weights of layer
l, so the feature maps of each layer should be stored in
the buffer for gradient computing. In pipeline cases, buffer
requirement increases with the network depth. In the training
process of AttackNet, weights no longer need to be updated,
so neurons of feature maps of a layer can be dropped once
the next layer gets its neurons. The reason lies in that the
system does not compute the gradient of weights anymore.
The buffer requirement of AttackNet relies on two types of
data, derivatives of the ReLU function with respect to feature
maps and errors of each layer. ReLU is max(x, 0) whose
derivative is a 0-1 matrix, which means the system is capable
of storing elements of a matrix using a bit map rather than
using a floating matrix. In this way, the required on-chip buffer
can be significantly reduced.
In this paper, we will use Pipelayer as the baseline because
it is the only processing-in-memory (PIM) platform supporting
CNN training. The power and area of the baseline are summa-
rized in Table I. According to the observation shown in Fig.1,
it is unnecessary to equip A3 with large buffers. Therefore,
we can trade off the buffer space with more crossbars for
Fig. 7: Shift&Add unit design
Fig. 8: Max pooling unit design
faster computations. Assuming that the buffer being taken
away accounts for P and A for power and area respectively,
we can make use of the same power or area to add more
crossbars separately. We denote the power of a crossbar and
associated units as p, and the area of a crossbar and associated
units as a.
Under different constraints, we can have two design options.
The first design A3p is to increase the number of crossbars
and associated units by P/p, leading to the same power
budget with the baseline. The second design A3r increases
the number of crossbars and associated units by A/a, thus
resulting in the same area space to the baseline. As we will see
in the methodology section, A3r will incur power overhead,
but the performance efficiency of it is slightly higher than that
of baseline for some benchmarks.
B. Improving crossbar utilization: A3px and A3rx
Traditionally, dual-crossbar is used to store weight matrices
[11] [12] [14]. In this manner, the difference between the two
crossbars equals the actual weight values. The drawback of
this method is that only half of crossbars on-chip are used to
perform dot-production.
As illustrated in Fig.6, the crossbar of A3 adds a column of
constant-term circuits 1/RF on the left of the custom crossbar.
The memristor’s conductance at the crossing point of the ith
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row and jth column is gi,j . Vin,m is the voltage applied to
the mth row. According to Kirchhoff’s current law, the current
along the kth bit line is
Vout,k = −
[
m∑
s=1
(R1 · gs,k − R1
RF
)Vin,s
]
This value can be directly fed to the analog-to-digital unit
instead of going through a subtractor. The overhead incurred
by the constant-term 1/RF and the OP amp is negligible [19].
With this minor modification, we can store weights using a
single crossbar instead of two crossbars and improve resource
utilization significantly.
The single crossbar optimization can be incorporated with
the proposed A3p and A3r designs to further improve the
crossbar utilization. We refer the combined techniques as
A3px and A3rx respectively.
C. Shift&Add Unit and Max pooling Unit Design
The multiplication of two binary numbers comes down to
calculating partial products. The Shift&Add unit is shown in
Fig.7. The most significant 4 bits enter the unit, are shifted
left, then being accumulated with the least significant 4 bits.
The output of the adder is the product of the original two
binary numbers.
The max pooling unit design is presented in Fig.8. Overall,
the unit is implemented in a tree-like manner with depth
equaling two. In the first stage, it takes in four inputs and
compares the two pair of numbers in parallel. The outputs of
the first stage not only include the comparison result of each
comparator but also cover the input indices of the comparator
results. Both the indices are fed to a multiplexer whose output
is determined by another comparator in the second stage.
Finally, the max pooling unit outputs the maximum value of
the four inputs, and the index corresponds to that maximum
value.
Differences with PipeLayer: A3 explores buffer opti-
mization due to the uniqueness of AttackNet algorithms, and
redesigns functional units to accommodate weight storage
in single crossbars. All optimization techniques enable A3
to outperform Pipelayer in throughput and energy efficiency
compared to deploying AttackNets on PipeLayer.
IV. PIPELINE ANALYSIS
Fig. 9: An AttackNet training example: two convolutional
layers and two fully connected layers. The batch size is 3.
In this section, we take a network of four layers as an exam-
ple to illustrate how crossbar counts affect performance. The
AttackNet example in Fig.9 is composed of two convolutional
layers (L1,L2) and two fully connected layers (L3,L4).The
weight matrix of each layer is W1, W2, W4 and W4. Each
layer accounts one cycle when its weight matrix is available.
Otherwise, it should wait for its weight matrix, which can
overwrite other weight matrices if and only if they have been
used by the last image in the same batch.
Assuming a memristor crossbar based CNN training plat-
form is equipped with C crossbars, we can only pre-program
W1 and W2 into these C crossbars. In this case, Fig.10 shows
the pipeline details when batch size equals three. Fig.10(b)
focuses on image1 of the first batch. The system processes L1
(corresponding to stage1) in the 1st cycle, followed by stage2
that proceeds the computation of L2 in the 2nd cycle. The
system should wait for W1 and W2 being used by image3,
meanwhile stall image1 in the following two cycles and
image2 in the 4th cycle, then is capable of programming W3
and W4 into crossbars in the 5th cycle. After that, the system
performs the computation of the two fully connected layers,
L3 and L4, in the 6th cycle and the 7th cycle respectively. In
the 8th cycle and the 9th cycle, the system computes the error
of L4 for image1 and image2 respectively. During the 10th
cycle, the system computes the error of L4 for image3 and
accumulate errors for all images in this batch. Note that the
error computation of L4 needs target labels instead of a weight
matrix. The system can process L3 and L2 in the following
two cycles (the 11th and 12th cycle) because W4 and W3 are
already in crossbars. After the 12th cycle, the system needs to
wait for an extra cycle to program W2 and W1 into crossbars.
Finally, the system computes the error of input in the 15th
cycle, then updates the mask of inputs in the next cycle. All the
above processes are illustrated in Fig.10(b) and summarized
in Fig.11.
As crossbar counts increase, A3 significantly decreases the
overwritten times, thus reducing the processing time of a
batch. The Fig.10(c) shows the pipeline when A3 can store
the whole network parameters (the weight matrix of all layers).
More crossbars delete stall cycles, thus reducing the processing
time of one batch of inputs. Further increasing crossbars
enables more than one set of the network parameters to be
programmed into crossbars. Fig.10(d) shows the pipeline when
A3 can store three copies of the whole network parameters.
As we can see, the pipeline of multiple input sets is similar
to that of the super-scalar processor.
V. METHODOLOGY
Power and Area Model: In this work, we use CACTI 7.0
[20] at 32 nm to model the power and area of the SRAM buffer
(input/output registers). The consumption of power and area of
eDRAM are measured using Destiny [21] at 32 nm. The area
and energy for memristor-based crossbar are adapted from [22]
[23]. The area and power of DAC and ADC are modeled from
the analysis [24] and ISAAC [13]. For simplicity, we use a 1-
bit DAC. The power and area of the Shift&Add unit, the Max
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Fig. 10: Pipeline analysis for the network example.
Fig. 11: Pipeline stages for the AttackNet training example.
Baseline (Pipelayer)
Size Power(w) Area(mmˆ2) #count Total Power Total Area
eDRAM buffer 32MB 4.49 16.364 1 4.49 16.364
Output Register 128KB 0.04 0.175 1 0.037 0.175
Input Register 128KB 0.037 0.1752 1 0.037 0.175
crossbar 128*128 0.0003 0.000025 16128 4.84 0.4
DAC 1*128 0.0005 0.00002125 16128 8.064 0.34272
ADC 8bits 0.002 0.0012 16128 32.256 19.3536
SUM 49.72 36.814
TABLE I: Baseline (Pipelayer) Configuration
A3p
Size Power(w) Area(mmˆ2) #count Total Power Total Area
eDRAM buffer 2MB 1.36 2.45 1 1.36 2.45
Output Register 16KB 0.01 0.015 1 0.01 0.01
Input Register 16KB 0.01 0.015 1 0.01 0.01
crossbar 128*128 0.0003 0.000025 17265 5.1795 0.43
DAC 1*128 0.0005 0.00002125 17265 8.63 0.3669
ADC 8bits 0.002 0.0012 17265 34.53 20.718
SUM 49.719 23.992
TABLE II: A3p Configuration
A3r
Size Power(w) Area(mmˆ2) #count Total Power Total Area
eDRAM buffer 2MB 1.36 2.45 1 1.36 2.45
Output Register 16KB 0.01 0.015 1 0.01 0.01
Input Register 16KB 0.01 0.015 1 0.01 0.01
crossbar 128*128 0.0003 0.000025 27553 8.27 0.689
DAC 1*128 0.0005 0.00002125 27553 13.78 0.586
ADC 8bits 0.002 0.0012 27553 55.11 33.064
SUM 78.53 36.813
TABLE III: A3r Configuration
Fig. 12: Benchmarks and the configurations.
pooling unit are negligible when compared with other units.
We developed the baseline accelerator following Pipelayer as
described in [14] with configurations listed in table I. A3p and
A3r are shown in table II and table III respectively.
Performance Model: To simulate the process, we devel-
oped an in-house simulator to model the training process of
adversarial attack algorithms, and to estimate the throughput
performance. The cycle time in A3 is 50.88ns, which is
consistent with Pipelayer [14]. The metrics we use are power
efficiency (PE, the number of 16-bit operations performed
per watt, GOPs/W ) and computational efficiency (CE, the
number of 16-bit operations performed per second per mm2,
GOPs/T ×mm2), both of which are defined in ISAAC [13].
Benchmarks: The benchmarks we used in this paper
are selected from from [3] [25]. The benchmark configura-
tions are listed in Fig.12. lisa1, gtsrb1, Inception v3-1 and
madry mnist1 are the same as that in the original literature.
lisa2, gtsrb2, Inception v3-2 and madry mnist2 are modified
from lisa1, gtsrb1, Inception v3-1 and madry mnist1 to make
the test networks’ architecture more diverse.
VI. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
According to the previous discussion, A3p and A3r have
the same power and the same area to the baseline respectively.
To further increase the throughput, we apply single crossbar
storage to both designs. All the performance results are shown
in Fig.13. From Fig.13(a), reducing the number of buffers
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(a) Performance improvement on the same power budget
(b) Performance improvement on the same area budget
Fig. 13: Speedup results over the baseline. All results are
normalized to the baseline.
to make room for crossbars can bring a little performance
improvement under the same power budget due to the lim-
ited power saving brought by buffer reduction. In contrast,
single crossbar storage significantly increases performance.
The results of keeping the same area budget are presented
in Fig.13(b). The speedup of all benchmarks on A3r is
larger than that of A3p. The area reduction brought by buffer
reduction enables more crossbars to be added to A3. As can
be seen in table II and table III, A3r owns more crossbar than
A3p.
Since the power of A3p is the same as that of the base-
line, we only compare the computational efficiency results in
Fig.14. Compared with 13(a), CE speedups of all benchmarks
on A3p are more obvious. The reason can be found in table
I and II. Keeping the same power budget, the area of A3p is
smaller than that of the baseline.
We only compare the power efficiency of all benchmarks
on A3r in Fig.15 because the area of A3r is the same as that
of the baseline. Though increasing crossbars in A3r incurred
power overheads, the geometric mean of the PE is better than
that of the baseline. However, some benchmarks’ PE on Ar
are slightly worse than that on the baseline.
Fig.16 shows the results of weight overwritten times of
all benchmarks. The overwritten times of A3p, A3px, A3r
and A3rx are normalized to that of the baseline. Relatively,
A3px and A3r reduce the numbers of weight overwritten
Fig. 14: Computational efficiency improvement on A3p
Fig. 15: Power efficiency improvement on A3r
much more than A3p and A3r do. Madry minst1 does not
have any weight overwritten in all cases. Gtsrb1 does not need
overwrite weights onA3r,A3px, andA3rx. Overall, we can
observe that reducing overwritten times can bring performance
benefits for all benchmarks. This figure is largely inverse to
the speedups shown in Fig. 13.
Fig.17 provides the breakdown of the energy consumption
by different components. The total energy consumption is
divided into five parts, ADC energy, DAC energy, Buffer
energy, crossbar energy and others. From Fig.17, we can
see clearly the proportion of ADC consumption and DAC
consumption in A3px and A3rx are larger than that in A3.
The reason is that both A3px and A3rx own more crossbar
than A3. The number of ADC and DAC are in proportional
to crossbar numbers.
Accuracy and convergence discussion: AttackNet aim to
misclassifying inputs, thus generating a mask for training a
robust deep learning network, so they are less sensitive to ac-
curacy than CNN training. The accuracy of AttackNet should
take convergence into account, which means results should
be evaluated by pairing the iteration with the corresponding
misclassifying rate. The bit-widths of neurons and weights in
this work are constant with ISAAC, and have no effects on
AttackNet according to our observations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Adversarial Attacks to CNNs are an emerging topic in the
deep neural networks area. In this paper, we propose the
7
(a) The percentage of overwritten on the same power budget
(b) The percentage of overwritten on the same area budget
Fig. 16: Weight overwritten proportions vary with optimiza-
tion. All the results are normalized to the baseline.
Fig. 17: Energy Breakdown
first hardware accelerator for adversarial attacks based on
memristor crossbar arrays. Compared to conventional CNN
training architectures, the proposed design significantly im-
proves performance and energy efficiency.
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